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ABSTRACT
As the most competitive solution for next-generation net-
work, software-defined network (SDN) and its dominant im-
plementation OpenFlow, are attracting more and more inter-
ests. But besides convenience and flexibility, SDN/OpenFlow
also introduces new kinds of limitations and security issues.
Of these limitations, the most obvious and maybe the most
neglected one, is the flow table capacity of SDN/OpenFlow
switches.
In this paper, we proposed a novel inference attack tar-
geting at SDN/OpenFlow network, which is motivated by
the limited flow table capacities of SDN/OpenFlow switches
and the following measurable network performance decrease
resulting from frequent interactions between data plane and
control plane when the flow table is full. To our best knowl-
edge, this is the first proposed inference attack model of this
kind for SDN/OpenFlow. We also implemented an inference
attack framework according to our model and examined its
efficiency and accuracy. The simulation results demonstrate
that our framework can infer the network parameters(flow ta-
ble capacity and flow table usage) with an accuracy of 80%
or higher. These findings give us a deeper understanding of
SDN/OpenFlow limitations and serve as guidelines to future
improvements of SDN/OpenFlow.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Se-
curity and protection
Keywords
SDN, inference attack, information leakage
1. INTRODUCTION
By decoupling the control plane from the data plane,
Software-Defined Network (SDN) makes programmabil-
ity a built-in feature for networks, thereby introducing
automaticity and flexibility to the networking manage-
ment. SDN has therefore been foreseen as the key tech-
nology that enables the next generation of networking
paradigm. Despite its promise, one of the most signifi-
cant barriers towards SDN’s wide practical deployment
resides in overwhelming security concerns. Therefore,
proactively detecting, quantifying, and mitigating its
security vulnerabilities becomes of fundamental impor-
tance.
In spite of its novelty, SDN indeed reuses various
design and implementation elements ranging from ar-
chitectures and protocols to systems from traditional
network. It is not surprising that SDN inheres the vul-
nerabilities intrinsic to these elements. For example,
similar to any networked service, secure channels be-
tween controllers and switches might be disrupted by
DDoS attacks; like firewall rules, the flow entries may
also conflict with each other, leaking unwanted traffic;
malicious arp spoofing generated by attackers may poi-
son the controller MAC table, disturbing the normal
topology information gathering and packet forwarding;
untrusted applications may instrument SDN controller
to perform malicious behaviors without proper access
control, which is one of the design objectives for mod-
ern operating systems. In response, existing research in
the context of SDN security mainly focuses on detect-
ing and mitigating these vulnerabilities. For example,
[1] evaluates man-in-the-middle attacks that target at
SDN/OpenFlow secure channels; FortNOX [2] brings
security enforcement module into NOX [3] and enables
real-time flow entry conflict check; VeriFlow [4] detects
network-wide invariant violations by acting as a trans-
parent layer between control plane and data plane.
In this paper, we introduce a novel SDN vulnerabil-
ity. The novelty of this vulnerability stems from the
feedback-loop nature of SDN, a fundamental difference
compared with traditional networks.
Specifically, most commercial SDN/OpenFlow switches
have limited flow table capacities, ranging from hun-
dreds to thousands [5]. Such capacity is usually insuf-
ficient to handle millions of flows that are typical for
enterprise and data center networks [6]. Nevertheless,
the flow table capacity was just considered as a po-
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tential bottleneck of resource consuming attacks in the
past, motivating researches on flow caching systems like
[7], [8] and [9]. But according to our analysis, the flow
table capacity can lead to inference attack and privacy
leakage under certain circumstances.
As a consequence of flow table overflow, the SDN
controller needs to dynamically maintain the flow table
by inserting and deleting flow entries. The maintain-
ing process typically include packet information trans-
ferring, routing rule calculation and flow entry deploy-
ment, which leads to measurable network performance
decrease.
Particularly, once the flow table is full, extra interac-
tions between controller and switch are needed to re-
move certain existing flow entries to make room for
newly generated flow entries, resulting in further net-
work performance decrease. An attacker can therefore
leverage the perceived performance change to deduce
the internal state of the SDN. To be more specific, we
consider the scenario that an attacker resides in a net-
work that is managed by a SDN. The attacker can then
actively generate network traffic, triggering the interac-
tions between the controller and switch with respect to
flow entry insertion and deletion. The attacker can then
measure the change of the network performance to es-
timate the internal state of the SDN including the flow
table capacity and flow table usage. We have designed
innovative algorithms to exploit this vulnerability and
quantify their effectiveness on exploiting this vulnera-
bility based on extensive evaluation.
To summarize, in this paper we made the following
contributions:
• We have identified a novel vulnerability introduced
by the limited flow table capacities of SDN/OpenFlow
switches and formalized that threat.
• We have designed effective algorithms that can
successfully exploit this vulnerability to accurately
infer the internal states of the SDN network in-
cluding flow table capacity and flow table usage.
• We have performed extensive evaluation to quan-
tify the effectiveness of proposed algorithms. The
experimental results have demonstrated that the
discovered vulnerability indeed leads to significant
security concerns: our algorithm can infer the net-
work parameters with an accuracy of 80% or higher
across various network settings.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 gives an overview of some background information.
Section 3 gives an overall statement of the inference at-
tack problem. Section 4 and 5 give detailed inference
algorithms targeting at FIFO and LRU replacement al-
gorithms respectively. Section 6 gives a detailed eval-
uation of the simulation results. Section 7 is a brief
discussion about our findings and future research. Fi-
nally, section 9 concludes this paper.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Software-Defined Network
Software Defined Network (SDN) is a competitive so-
lution for next-generation network. SDN offers network
programmability by separating the control plane from
the data plane. Network functions like routing calcu-
lation and link discovery are extracted from switches
(data plane) and implemented by centralized controllers
(control plane). OpenFlow [10] is the most prominent
SDN implementation.
In a SDN network, the controller gathers network
topology information and makes high-level routing deci-
sions while the switches only perform the functionality
of packet forwarding according to routing rules assigned
by the controller. The dedicated link connecting con-
troller and switch is called secure channel. Controller
and switch communicates via secure channel using the
OpenFlow protocol. Controller also exposes network
control APIs or north-bound interfaces so network ad-
ministrators can write their own network management
applications to more effectively run their networks.
2.2 SDN Datacenter Network
The decoupled nature of SDN introduces programma-
bility, automaticity and flexibility to the networking
management, making SDN a popular solution for large-
scale datacenter networks. Figure 1 is a network struc-
ture comparison showing the difference between tradi-
tional datacenter network and SDN-based datacenter
network.
Figure 1: SDN/OpenFlow Structure
In traditional datacenter network, the administra-
tor needs to configure switches separately. Switches
from different vendors with different managing tools be-
come a major obstacle in network management. What’s
worse, each switch only handles a fragment of the whole
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network, the lack of global network topology makes it
impossible to optimize network traffic dynamically and
globally.
Compared with traditional network, SDN reveals great
potential in datacenter networks because of its attrac-
tive advantages. The SDN controller stores global net-
work topology so that the network can be efficiently
optimized. The unified network APIs provided by con-
troller make it easy to perform network management.
There have been several successful commercial deploy-
ments of SDN in datacenter networks. B4 [11] network
implemented by Google utilizes SDN to schedule net-
work traffic between Google’s global datacenters and
achieves the maximum link usage of almost 100 per-
cent; Microsoft deploys SWAN [12] to dynamically re-
configure routing paths of network traffic to optimize
inter-datacenter network utilization. Evaluation shows
that SWAN can carry 60% more traffic than traditional
network.
2.3 Information Leakage in Datacenter Net-
work
In modern datacenter networks like Microsoft Azure
and Amazon EC2, customer VMs are usually multi-
plexed across shared physical infrastructures. Besides
achieving a high utilization of hardware and software
resources, this approach also introduces new vulnerabil-
ities. Previously published researches have shown that
transparently shared physical infrastructures can lead
to potential cross-VM information leakage.
At first glance information leakage might seem in-
nocuous, but in fact it is quite useful for clever attack-
ers and will bring security issues in many aspects. The
leakage of cache miss information is used in extraction
and inference of RSA [13] and AES [14] secret keys.
The leakage of inter-keystroke time information can be
used to perform recovery of the password in keystroke
timing attack. The leakage of network topology might
provide weapons to attackers because some attacks are
only possible when attacker’s VM is executed on the
same physical server with victim’s VM [15]. The leak-
age of network performance information might make it
possible for commercial spies to estimate the number
of visitors to a co-resident server belonging to competi-
tors and further infer the operation situation of their
company. Thus information leakage in datacenter net-
works is drawing more and more attentions in network
security and privacy researches.
2.4 Flow Table Capacity
Flow table is a hardware structure in OpenFlow switch,
it stores hundreds to thousands of routing rules called
flow entries. These flow entries are generated and as-
signed by the controller. Every time a network packet
arrives in the switch, the switch will look up its flow
table to find corresponding flow entries. If there exists
a corresponding flow entry, the switch will forward the
network packet according to the actions associated with
that flow entry. If there is no flow entry matching this
network packet, the switch will send the packet to the
controller through the secure channel, then controller
will calculate and generate a new flow entry and assign
it to the switch.
Previous works typically assume that the flow table of
each switch can hold an infinite number of flow entries,
which makes the controller easy to design. In practice,
however, this assumption does not hold, and the switch
flow table capacity can become a significant bottleneck
to scaling SDN networks. SDN/OpenFlow switch flow
tables often cannot scale beyond a few hundred entries,
because they typically include wildcards, and therefore
are implemented using either complex and slow data
structures, or expensive and extremely power-hungry
ternary content-addressable memories (TCAM). Typ-
ical SDN/OpenFlow switches have rather limited flow
table capacities from 750 to 3000 flow entries while han-
dling about 100,000 concurrent flows in data centers.
The flow table capacity bottleneck leads to potential
flow table overflow, which is unacceptable.
Combine the flow table capacity issue of SDN switches
and the resource sharing phenomenon in SDN-based
datacenter networks, we discover the possibility of per-
forming inference attacks targeting at SDN vulnerabil-
ities. A formalized problem statement will be given in
next section.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Considering the wide use of SDN/OpenFlow in data
center networks, we assume the inference attack scene
to be in a SDN-based multi-tenant datacenter network
like Amazon EC2 or Microsoft Azure. In a SDN-based
datacenter network, different tenants connected to the
same switch will share the flow table space. The flow
table capacity’s importance as key network parameter
and the possibility of inference attack hidden behind
the flow table sharing phenomenon make it natural for
us to take flow table capacity as our primary inference
target. Besides inferring intrinsic and static property
of the switch (flow table capacity), further inference
should be performed on the flow table usage condition
of other tenants in the same datacenter, which reflects
the real-time dynamic resource consuming situation in
datacenter networks. So we choose flow table usage as
our secondary inference target. But inferring flow table
capacity and flow table usage is not that easy.
As cloud computing infrastructures, data center net-
works are typically well-managed and equipped with
advanced firewalls and intrusion detection systems. In
order to avoid triggering the IDS, we must behave like
an ordinary tenant, which means we cannot gather sen-
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sitive information or directly hack into the controller.
What’s worse, with the constraints of passiveness and
concealment, the available parameters for our inference
attack are further limited.
After analyzing current structure and implementa-
tions of SDN/OpenFlow, its decoupled nature gives us
inspiration: the interactions between control plane and
data plane will lead to network performance decrease,
which can be measured through performance parame-
ters like round trip time (RTT).
Figure 2: OpenFlow Packet Processing
Flowchart
Fig 2 gives an overall flowchart of packet process-
ing in an OpenFlow switch. The three rectangular re-
gions surrounded by dotted line stand for three possi-
ble packet processing branches respectively. When the
switch encounters an incoming packet, it will parse it
and send the parsed packet into the subsequent process-
ing pipeline.
Then as the first step of the pipeline, the switch will
lookup its flow table to search flow entries matching the
packet. When there is a match, the switch will directly
forward the packet according to actions associated with
the corresponding flow entry. This branch is illustrated
in the innermost rectangle of fig 2.
When there is no corresponding flow entry in the flow
table, extra steps will be introduced into the procedure.
Additional interactions between the switch and the con-
troller will happen to acquire corresponding routing rules,
including packet information transferring, routing rule
calculation and flow entry deployment. The middle
rectangle of fig 2 illustrates this process.
Before the switch inserts the newly generated flow
entry, it has to check the flow table status to make sure
that there is enough space in the flow table. When the
flow table is full, the controller has to perform flow table
replacement operations to make room for the upcoming
flow entry. These operations include deciding which
old flow entry to delete according to certain flow table
replacement algorithm and flow entry deletion. The
outermost rectangle in fig 2 stands for this branch.
That is exactly where the vulnerability lies. In tradi-
tional networks, the switches and routers are autonomous,
which means they can maintain their routing tables lo-
cally without interacting with an external device. But
due to the decoupled nature of SDN/OpenFlow, main-
taining switch flow tables needs frequent interactions
between switches and controllers, making it possible
for an attacker to leverage the perceived performance
change to deduce the internal state of the SDN network.
As shown in fig 2, the rectangular regions surrounded
by dotted line correspond to different possible packet
processing branches. The larger a rectangle is, the longer
the processing time of that branch will be because of
the extra steps that rectangle contains. When there is
a match in the flow table, the processing time will be
the shortest; when there is no match in the flow table
and the flow table is not full, the processing time will be
longer because of addition routing calculation and flow
entry deployment; when there is no match in the flow
table and the flow table is full, the processing time will
be the longest because a flow table replacement opera-
tion has to be performed. So as a network parameter
directly influenced by the processing time, the RTT of
a packet can serve as an indicator of flow table state
and flow entry state.
The process of deciding RTT thresholds for flow table
state detection is shown in figure 3.
Figure 3: RTT Measurement of Different Flow
Table State
The two sub-figures in figure 3 represent two cooper-
ating threads, the x-axis represents the packet sequence
and the y-axis represents the recorded RTT of every
packet. Firstly, in the upper thread, we generate a
packet with a specific {src ip, dst ip, src mac, dst mac}
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combination, calling it Pkt1. Send Pkt1 to the target
OpenFlow switch and record the corresponding RTT as
T2. Currently there is no corresponding flow entry in
the OpenFlow switch because Pkt1 is a new packet. Af-
ter a time span TS1, send Pkt1 to the target OpenFlow
switch again and record the corresponding RTT as T1.
If TS1 is chosen properly, the newly installed flow en-
try matching Pkt1 should still exist in the OpenFlow
switch. Next, in the lower thread, we continuously gen-
erate packets Pkt2, Pkt3, · · · PktN , each with a differ-
ent combination of {src ip, dst ip, src mac, dst mac},
and send these packets to the target OpenFlow switch
with the time span of TS2. Because there are no flow
entries matching there packets in the OpenFlow switch,
the recorded RTTs will be approximately the same as
T2. Keep generating and sending packets until we ob-
serve a sudden increase of the RTT, which indicates
that the flow table is full. Then in the upper thread
we send Pkt1 again immediately and record the RTT
as T3. To achieve higher precision, we can repeat the
process and use average values of T1, T2 and T3 as final
results.
From the process above we can see T1, T2, T3 will
serve as thresholds for flow table state detection: when
the measured RTT is around T1, we can infer that there
is corresponding flow entry in the flow table; when the
measured RTT is around T2, we can infer that there
is no corresponding flow entry in the flow table and
the flow table is not full; when the measured RTT is
around T3, we can infer that there is no correspond-
ing flow entry in the flow table and the flow table is
full. The measured RTT thresholds corresponding to
different flow table states are shown in table 1.
Table 1: RTT Comparison
Flow Table State Flow Entry State RTT
NotFull Exist 0.2− 0.3ms
NotFull NotExist 3− 5ms
Full Exist 0.2− 0.3ms
Full NotExist 8− 10ms
Having got a method to detect flow table state and
flow entry state using the bootstrap process above, our
inference model will follow a ”probe–observe–infer” pat-
tern. We model the SDN/OpenFlow network as a black
box and observe its response (RTT) to different input
(network packets), then we use the response to estimate
the flow table state and flow entry state and perform
further inference. The whole process comes in three
steps.
Firstly, we send probing packets into the network to
trigger the interaction. As there is still no mature rout-
ing aggregation algorithm or hierarchical routing rule
solution, current SDN/OpenFlow switches typically use
exact-match rules. That means if we send n packets
with different faked meta information like src ip and
dst ip, there will be n newly generated flow entries in-
serted into the flow table. If we send excessive probing
packets in a short period of time, the flow table will
overflow and then the interaction process will be trig-
gered. Secondly, we measure RTTs of the responded
packets and infer the flow table state and flow entry
state. Thirdly, we use observed flow table states and
flow table states as controlling signals in our inference
algorithm and perform flow table capacity inference.
But there is still one problem: how will the flow ta-
ble deal with the flow entries when the flow table is
full. In other words, we need to know the flow table
replacement algorithm. The algorithm decides the in-
ternal state transition of a SDN network thus it’s an es-
sential part of our inference model. Though flow table
replacement algorithms of commercial SDN/OpenFlow
switches are stored in their firmwares, making it impos-
sible for researchers to read, we can still get illumina-
tions of what the algorithms will be like by analyzing
the functionalities of flow tables.
Flow table in a SDN/OpenFlow switch stores the lo-
cal router tables assigned by the controller. Having to
achieve a hit rate as high as possible in a rather lim-
ited space, flow table serves like a ”cache” in operating
systems and web proxy servers. So we have reason to
believe that the flow table replacement algorithm will be
some of the most popular cache replacement algorithms
or their variations. In this paper we choose FIFO[16]
and LRU[17] because they are common and popular.
So far we have finished our inference model targeting
at flow table capacity and there is still another target:
flow table usage inference. Though flow table usage in-
ference seems impossible because network traffic is iso-
lated among different tenants, the information leakage
attack mentioned in section 2 and our previous analysis
provide us with possible breakthrough points: we can
infer the flow table capacity and we can record gener-
ated flow entries during a time period, the difference of
these two values will be the flow table usage during that
time period.
Last but not least, we have to discuss the feasibility of
our inference attack as well as some key parameters. In
order to facilitate the description, we will first introduce
the flow entry deletion mechanism of OpenFlow.
Flow entry deletion mechanism of OpenFlow includes
two main parts: active flow deletion invoked by con-
troller and passive flow deletion invoked by timeout.
According to OpenFlow specification, each flow entry
has two timeout values — hard timeout and idle timeout.
Hard timeout decides how long a flow entry will live af-
ter it has been inserted while idle timeout means the
longest time of no packet matching before a flow entry
5
is deleted. The feasibility of our inference attack will be
associated with timeout values and the feasibility analy-
sis consists of two parts: RTT bootstrap feasibility and
probing feasibility.
3.1 RTT Bootstrap Feasibility
In RTT bootstrap process illustrated in figure 3, there
are three key parameters: TS1, TS2 and TS3. Both TS1
and TS3 should not exceed the minimum of hard timeout
and idle timeout because we must prevent the flow en-
try matching Pkt1 from being deleted in the whole pro-
cess, which depends on TS1 and TS3 respectively. In
order to shorten TS3, TS2 should not be too long be-
cause its the time span between every packet and TS3 is
made up of (n− 1) numbers of TS2. In conclusion, the
feasibility constraints for RTT bootstrap are as follows:
(n− 1)TS2 = TS3 (1)
TS1 ≤ min{hard timeout, idle timeout} (2)
TS3 ≤ min{hard timeout, idle timeout} (3)
3.2 Probing Feasibility
The key part of our inference model is triggering in-
teractions between switches and controllers by sending
probing packets in a short period of time, so the feasi-
bility of our inference attack depends on the feasibility
of triggering flow table overflow to a large extent. If we
use Vgen to represent our packet generating speed and
use Vdel to represent the packet deletion speed and C,
T to represent the flow table capacity and the probing
time, the feasibility formulation will be:
Vgen × T − Vdel × T ≥ C (4)
Or in another form:
Vgen ≥ Vdel + C/T (5)
As can be seen from the formulation, the minimum
packet generating speed required are associated with
the flow entry deletion speed and flow table capacity. If
we set T to be shorter than the minimum of hard timeout
and idle timeout, which means our inference can be
completed in a timeout circle, the flow entries deleted
during our inference due to timeout will be ignorable.
The feasibility constraint will be:
Vgen ≥ C/min{hard timeout, idle timeout} (6)
From the feasibility constraints above, we can con-
clude that the feasibility of our inference attack depends
on the timeout measurement. It is essential for us to
measure hard timeout and idle timeout not only for in-
ference time limit but also for packet generating speed
adjustment.
Idle timeout can be measured by sending a train of
packets with gradually increasing packet intervals. The
process is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Idle timeout Measurement
We choose an initial value of packet interval ∆T1, for
example 0.1s. Then we gradually increase the packet
interval to ∆T2, ∆T3 and so on using ”binary search”
or other algorithms. Keep sending these packets with
increasing intervals until we observe a significantly high
RTT value. The corresponding packet interval at that
time will be the idle timeout.
Hard timeout can be measured by sending a train of
packets with constant packet intervals far smaller that
the previously measured idle timeout. Keep sending
packets with a packet interval of ∆T , for example 0.1s.
When observing a significantly high RTT value, the
corresponding packet interval will be the hard timeout.
The process is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Hard timeout Measurement
In this section we set our inference targets to be flow
table capacity and flow table usage, we also discussed
the inference model and its feasibility. In section 4 and
5 we’ll give detailed descriptions of inference algorithms
for FIFO and LRU respectively.
4. FIFO INFERENCE ALGORITHM
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As mentioned in section 3, the inference process of
FIFO algorithm will be as follows: we generate and
send a huge amount of probing packets each with a dif-
ferent combination of src ip, dst ip, src mac, dst mac,
the newly inserted flow entries matching the generated
packets will ”push” the other users’ flow entries out of
the flow table. We can detect if the flow table is full
and the existence of our flow entries. Combined with
the number of inserted flow entries we recorded, we can
infer the flow table capacity and flow table usage. The
process of flow table state transformation is shown in
figure 6.
Figure 6: FIFO Inference Principle
We use Four to represent the number of our inserted
flow entries and use Fother to represent the number of
flow entries from other users in the flow table. Both
Four and Fother are functions of time. We use TA, TB ,
TC and TD to represent four time points corresponding
to four sub figures respectively and use C to respresent
the flow table capacity.
Figure 6 (A) shows the flow table and the flow entries
it contains just before the experiment starts. The rect-
angle items represent the flow entries from other users
sharing the OpenFlow switch. The current number of
other users’ flow entries can be expressed as Fother(TA).
Figure 6 (B) illustrates the time when we start to
send generated packets, inserting new flow entries into
the flow table. The grey rectangles represent the flow
entries inserted by us. As we can see, our flow entries
keep pushing other users’ flow entries to the front of
the FIFO queue. During the experiment, we should
keep a record of the generated packets, including their
attributes and serial numbers.
Figure 6 (C) shows the time when we detect the flow
table is full. At this point of time, flow entries from
us and other users add up to fill the whole flow table
precisely. We have:
Four(TC) + Fother(TC) = C (7)
Figure 6 (D) shows the time when we detect that
one of our inserted flow entries has been deleted. That
means the flow table is now full of our flow entries,
without any flow entries from other users. We have:
Four(TD) = C (8)
Combine the two equations above, we have:
Fother(TA) = Fother(TC)
= C − Four(TC) = Four(TD)− Four(TC)
(9)
According to the analysis above, we describe the in-
ference process for FIFO algorithm as shown below.
Algorithm 1 FIFO Inference Algorithm
Require:
1: Packet-Sending Function: SendPacket ();
2: List of IP: IP ;
Ensure:
3: The flow table capacity: Fcapacity;
4: The number of other users’ flow entries: Fother;
5: Fcapacity ← 0
6: Fother ← 0
7: N ← 0
8: N1 ← 0
9: N2 ← 0
10: while N < length(IP ) do
11: ip← IP [N ]
12: SendPacket(ip)
13: N ← N + 1
14: if Flow table is full then
15: N1 ← N
16: continue
17: end if
18: if One of our flow entries is deleted then
19: N2 ← N
20: break
21: end if
22: end while
23: Fcapacity ← N2
24: Fother ← N2 −N1
25: return Fcapacity, Fother
The main error of the inference comes from the flow
entries inserted by other users when our insertion is in
progress. We assume that our flow entry insertion speed
is fast enough so that during the period of experiment,
the newly inserted flow entries are all from us. But
that is not always the truth. Ignoring the possible flow
entries inserted by other users will make our inference
result smaller than the actual value.
Considering the flow entries inserted by other users,
the actual equations are listed below.
When we detect the flow table is full, if we use E(A,B)
to represent the number of just inserted flow entries
from other users from time point A to time point B,
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the equation becomes:
Four(TC) + Fother(TC) + E(TA, TC) = C (10)
And when we detect one of our inserted flow entries
is deleted, the equation becomes:
Four(TD) + E(TA, TC) + E(TC , TD) = C (11)
Combine the two equations above, we have:
Fother(TC) = Four(TD)− Four(TC) + E(TC , TD) (12)
So the actual equation considering flow entry inser-
tions during inference should be:
C = Four(TD) + E(TA, TC) + E(TC , TD)
Fother(TC) = Four(TD)− Four(TC) + E(TC , TD)
(13)
Compared with our former equation ignoring flow en-
try insertions:
C = Four(TD)
Fother(TC) = Four(TD)− Four(TC)
(14)
We can see that the inferred flow table usage Fother
and the inferred flow table capacity Fcapacity will both
be smaller than the actual value.
5. LRU INFERENCE ALGORITHM
The experiment principle of LRU algorithm has some-
thing in common with that of FIFO algorithm, because
under these two circumstances we can both keep our
flow entries stay in the back of the cache queue using
certain operations.However, there are still differences
lies in the flow entry maintaining process.
The nature of FIFO algorithm ensures that the posi-
tion of the flow entries only depends on the time they
are inserted. The earlier inserted flow entries are sure
to be nearer to the front of the cache queue compared
with the later inserted flow entries. But in LRU algo-
rithm, the positions of the flow entries depend not only
on the time they are inserted, but also on the last time
they are accessed. In order to keep our flow entries stay
in the back of the cache queue, we need to continuously
access the previously inserted flow entries.
During the maintain process, every time we insert
a new flow entry, we need to access all previously in-
serted flow entries for one time to ”lift” them to the
back of the cache queue. The access history may be like
{P1}, {P1, P2}, {P1, P2, P3}, {P1, P2, P3, P4}, · · · ,
we call it a ”rolling” maintaining process. The main-
taining algorithm is shown in algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Rolling Maintaining Algorithm
Require:
1: Packet-Sending Function: SendPacket();
2: List of Inserted IP: IPinserted;
3: function RollingPacketSender(IPinserted)
4: i← 1
5: while i < length(IPinserted) do
6: for j ← 0; j < i; j + + do
7: ip← IPinserted[j]
8: SendPacket(ip)
9: end for
10: i← i + 1
11: end while
12: end function
According to the analysis above, we describe the in-
ference process for LRU algorithm as shown below.
Algorithm 3 LRU Inference Algorithm
Require:
1: Packet-Sending Function: SendPacket ();
2: List of IP: IP ;
Ensure:
3: The flow table capacity: Fcapacity;
4: The number of other users’ flow entries: Fother;
5: Fcapacity ← 0
6: Fother ← 0
7: N ← 0
8: N1 ← 0
9: N2 ← 0
10: IPinserted ← [ ]
11: while N < length(IP ) do
12: ip← IP [N ]
13: IPinserted ← IPinserted + ip
14: RollingPacketSender(IPinserted)
15: N ← N + 1
16: if Flow table is full then
17: N1 ← N
18: continue
19: end if
20: if One of our flow entries is deleted then
21: N2 ← N
22: break
23: end if
24: end while
25: Fcapacity ← N2
26: Fother ← N2 −N1
27: return Fcapacity, Fother
The feasibility and error analysis of LRU algorithm is
similar with that of FIFO algorithm. The inferred flow
table usage Fother and the inferred flow table capacity
Fcapacity will both be smaller than the actual value be-
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cause of ignoring the flow entries inserted by other users
during the experiment.
6. EVALUATION
6.1 Implementation
The emulation environment of our experiment con-
sists of three parts: a network prototyping system used
to emulate host and switch, a network controller, and
our inference attack toolkit.
We choose Mininet [18] as the network prototyping
system because it encapsulates host and switch emu-
lation and thus easy to use. Our emulated network
prototype for evaluation uses a star topology, consist-
ing of 20 hosts connected to a single OpenFlow switch.
We build FIFO and LRU controller applications using
Python on the basis of POX [19] OpenFlow controller.
As for the inference attack toolkit, we use libnet [20] to
generate probing packets, and libpcap [21] to capture
replied packets. Experiments are conducted on a com-
puter with Intel i5-2400 3.1 GHz (4 cores) processor and
8GB RAM.
6.2 RTT Measurement
As we have mentioned in section 3, the difference be-
tween traditional network and SDN/OpenFlow network
in handling previously unseen packets gives us a possi-
ble indicator of the flow table state and the flow entry
living state – RTT. When there isn’t corresponding flow
entry existing in the flow table, the RTT of a packet will
significantly increase due to the interactions between
controller and switch in order to acquire new flow en-
tries. That is the case when there is still space in the
flow table. Once the flow table is full, the RTT of a
packet will further increase as a result of extra flow ta-
ble replacement operations. To prove the effectiveness
of using RTT as the flow table state and flow entry state
indicator, we measured packet RTTs corresponding to
different flow table state and flow entry state.
Figure 7: RTT Measurement
Figure 7 gives the RTT measurement result showing
the difference. The points with different colors repre-
sent the total 300 times of RTT measurements we have
conducted, 100 times of measurement for each combi-
nation of flow table state and flow entry state. The
green points stand for RTTs when flow entry exists in
flow table. The blue points and red points both stand
for RTTs when flow entry doesn’t exist in flow table,
the only difference is the flow table is not full when
measuring the blue points.
As can be seen from the figure, when flow entry ex-
ists in flow table, the packet RTTs are highly concen-
trated in the range of 0.2 ∼ 0.3 ms; when flow entry
doesn’t exist in flow table and flow table is not full, the
packet RTTs will increase to about 3 ∼ 5 ms; when
flow entry doesn’t exist in flow table and flow table is
full, the packet RTTs will be the highest, ranging from
6ms to 8ms. These three groups of RTTs all distribute
intensively in a small range without overlapping other
groups, showing the excellent discrimination of using
RTT as a flow table state and flow entry state indica-
tor.
To better illustrate the distribution of measured RTTs,
we plot their CDF curves in figure 8. Apparently RTT
can be used to deduce the internal state of the SDN
network effectively.
Figure 8: RTT Measurement Distribution
6.3 Timeout
6.3.1 Default Timeout Values
According to our previous analysis, the feasibility of
our inference attack depends on whether we can gener-
ate enough flow entries to fulfill the flow table within
a single timeout cycle. That means we must have the
ability to generate as many flow entries as the flow en-
try can hold during a timeout period. So we analyze
several popular open-source controllers and search for
their default timeout values in the built-in applications.
The result is presented in table 2. The zero values in
the table mean the corresponding timeout will not take
effect, or in other words the timeout value is ”perma-
nent”. As can be seen from the table, most available
controllers have timeout values in the range of 5s to 30s.
If we take the flow table capacity of 2000 flow entries
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Table 2: Default Timeout Values
Controller Hard timeout Idle timeout
Ryu 0 0
Beacon 0 5s
Floodlight 0 5s
NOX 0 5s
POX 30s 10s
Trema 0 60s
Maestro 180s 30s
as an example, the minimum packet generating speed
required will be 2000/5 = 400 packets per second, while
libnet can generate tens of thousand packets per second.
So the default timeout values ensure the feasibility of
our inference attack.
6.3.2 Timeout Measurement
Though default timeout values of mainstream Open-
Flow controllers can be read from their source codes, it’s
still possible for SDN network administrators to man-
ually change the default timeout values. In order to
handle non-default timeout values and provide basis for
adjusting packet generating speed, it’s essential to ex-
amine the accuracy of passive timeout measurement.
Figure 9 illustrates relative errors of hard timeout
and idle timeout measurement respectively. We man-
ually modify hard timeout and idle timeout values of
POX OpenFlow controller to 5s, 10s, 15s, 20s, 25s and
30s, then we use timeout measurement algorithm men-
tioned in section 3 to measure these timeout values and
calculate relative errors.
Figure 9: Timeout Relative Error
Every line in the two sub-figures corresponds to 10
times of repeated measurements conducted under a cer-
tain timeout setting from 5s to 30s. The margin stays
in the range of plus-or-minus 10 percent, showing the
effectiveness and high accuracy of our timeout measure-
ment algorithm.
6.4 Flow Table Capacity
Flow capacity is the primary target of our inference
attack. It reflects the hardware specification of an Open-
Flow switch. Figure 10 illustrates the flow table capac-
ity measurement result when controller adopts FIFO re-
placement algorithm. We manually limited the switch
flow table capacity to 10 different values from 100 flow
entries to 1000 flow entries and used our framework to
perform the inference.
Figure 10: FIFO Flow Table Capacity
The pink bars represent the manually set flow table
capacities or real capacities. The blue bars represent
the measured flow table capacities. For every manually
set flow table capacity, we conduct 10 times of repeated
measurements and take their mean value as the final
result. From the figure we can see that the measured
capacities is quite close to the real capacities, indicat-
ing the high accuracy of our inference framework. For
example, when the real capacity is 400 flow entries, our
measured capacity is 408 flow entries with an error of
only 8 flow entries. As the real capacity grows, the
packet generating speed required becomes faster, plac-
ing higher requirements on packet sending – receiving
synchronization and accurate timing. But our infer-
ence algorithm shows unbelievable stability and accu-
racy: when the real capacity is 1000 flow entries, our
measured capacity is 973 flow entries with an error of
just 27 flow entries.
Like figure 10, figure 11 also illustrates the flow table
capacity measurement results, with the only difference
of being performed under LRU replacement algorithm
instead of FIFO.
Figure 11: LRU Flow Table Capacity
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According to our previous analysis, the inference prin-
ciple of LRU replacement algorithm is more complex
because of the unavoidable mixed nature of flow entries
in the flow table and the rolling maintaining process.
But our inference framework still shows high accuracy
and reliability. Even when the real flow table capacities
are set to be rather large values like 900 and 1000, the
errors of our measure capacities are just around 20 flow
entries.
Only illustrating the mean value of measured flow ta-
ble capacities may not be enough: the mean value may
be the result of error compensations and hide the de-
tailed measurement errors of every separate experiment.
So in figure 12 we illustrates the relative error of every
single flow table capacity measurement.
Figure 12: Flow Table Capacity Relative Error
We choose 5 groups of different flow table capacities
from 200 flow entries to 1000 flow entries and perform
10 times of measurements under every single flow table
capacity value. The left sub-figure stands for relative
error of flow table capacity measurements conducted
under FIFO replacement algorithm, showing that the
margin is no larger than plus-or-minus 10 percent. The
right sub-figure stands for relative error of flow table
capacity measurements conducted under LRU replace-
ment algorithm. Due to the more complex inference
principle and the rolling maintaining process, the mar-
gin becomes larger but still hasn’t exceeded 15 percent
even in the worst case.
6.5 Flow Table Usage
In this section we evaluated our framework’s efficiency
of inferring the number of flow entries from other users
sharing the same flow table, or the flow table usage.
Flow table usage is our secondary inference target, it re-
flects the network resource consuming condition of other
tenants in the same SDN network. Figure 13 and figure
14 illustrate the flow table usage measurement results
conducted under FIFO and LRU replacement algorithm
respectively.
Figure 13: FIFO Flow Table Usage
Figure 14: LRU Flow Table Usage
Again we manually set 10 different flow table usage
values from 100 to 1000 flow entries by manually gen-
erating and inserting corresponding number of flow en-
tries into the flow table beforehand. Then we use our
inference algorithm to infer the flow table usage and
take mean values of every 10 times of measurements as
the final results. The errors of all these measurements
show the high accuracy, stability and reliability of our
inference algorithm.
The relative errors are shown in figure 15. We em-
ulate 5 groups of different flow table usage values and
conducted 10 times of flow table usage inference for ev-
ery single value. For both FIFO and LRU replacement
algorithm, the relative errors of flow table usage infer-
ence stay in a quite small range. The results prove that
our algorithm can infer other tenants’ flow table usage
condition in high accuracy.
Figure 15: Flow Table Usage Relative Error
7. DISCUSSION
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SDN/OpenFlow has become a competitive solution
for next generation network and is being more and more
widely used in modern datacenters. But considering its
key role as the datacenter fundamental infrastructure,
we have to admit that the security issues of SDN/OpenFlow
haven’t been explored to a large extent. Especially, the
flow table capacity of SDN/OpenFlow switch is only
considered as a vulnerable part for DDoS and flood-
ing attacks in published researches. But according to
our analysis in previous sections, the flow table capacity
can lead to potential inference attack if combined with
reasonable assumptions and RTT measurements.
Firstly, we found in section 3 that exact match flow
entries as well as the lack of route aggregation would
consume a lot of flow table space, making it impos-
sible to process millions of flows per seconding using
SDN/OpenFlow. Secondly, we found in section 6 that
assigning the decision making job of flow table replace-
ment to the controller would lead to significant network
performance decrease, which had to be changed in time.
Thirdly, there is currently no mature attack detection
mechanism for SDN/OpenFlow network, so it’s quite
easy for criminals to exploit system vulnerabilities or
invoke DDoS attacks.
All these security issues call for improvements to cur-
rent OpenFlow switch and flow table design. The im-
provements should at least contain three aspects: (1)new
flow table maintaining mechanism, like transferring the
flow entry deleting workload from controller to switch.
Switch itself can decide which flow entry to delete and
then sync with controller. In the newest OpenFlow
switch specification 1.4 [22], this mechanism has been
added as an optional feature, but without any mature
implementation so far; (2) routing aggregation. Rout-
ing aggregation can match a group of flows using one
flow entry, which will reduce the flow table consuming
significantly compared with exact match; (3) inference
attack detection. Administrators can develop inference
attack detecting applications and then perform defences
like port speed limiting or network address validation.
8. RELATED WORK
The inference attack proposed in this paper is moti-
vated by the limited flow table capacity of SDN/OpenFlow
switches. The flow table capacity issue has been pre-
sented in many previous works like [23], [24] and [25].
They all point out the limitation of switch flow table
memory and potential scalability and security issue.
However, these work don’t give further analysis on the
inference attack and information leakage caused by the
limited flow table capacity.
Kloti et al. [26] presents potentially problematic is-
sues in SDN/OpenFlow including information disclo-
sure through timing analysis. However, this informa-
tion disclosure requires disclosing existing flows with
side channel attack, which is hard to perform in real
world. Compared with their approach, our inference at-
tack is self-contained and requires no prior knowledge.
Gong et al. [27] presents a kind of inference attack
using RTT measurement to infer which website the vic-
tim is browsing. They recover victims’ network traffic
patterns based on the queuing side channel happened at
the Internet router. However, the scenario of their work
is in the public Internet, while our approach focus on
SDN/OpenFlow infrastructures in datacenter network.
Compared with public Internet and website inference,
the inference attack and information leakage in modern
data centers is more sensitive and valuable.
Shin et al. [28] demonstrate a novel attack targeting
at SDN networks. This attack includes fingerprinting
SDN networks and further flooding the data plane flow
table by sending specifically crafted fake flow requests
in high speed. In the fingerprinting phase, header field
change scanning is used to collect the different response
time (RTT) for new flow and existing flow. The finger-
printing result is then analyzed to estimate if the target
network used SDN technology. The RTT measurement
and analysis they used in fingerprinting is similar with
our approach. But they just perform DoS attacks to
the SDN network, without performing any further in-
formation leakage or network parameter inference.
9. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have explored the structure of SDN/
OpenFlow network and some of the possible security is-
sues it brings. After out detailed analysis of the SDN/
OpenFlow network, we proposed a novel inference at-
tack model targeting at the SDN/OpenFlow network,
which is the first proposed inference attack model of this
kind in the SDN/OpenFlow area. This inference attack
is introduced by the OpenFlow switch, especially by its
limited flow table capacity. The inference attack can
be done in a completely passive way, making it hard
to detect and defence. We also implemented the infer-
ence attack framework and examined the efficiency and
accuracy of it using network traffic data from different
sources. The simulation results show that the inference
attack framework can infer the network parameter(flow
table capacity and flow table usage) with an accuracy
of up to 80% or higher.
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